This is a comprehensive and analytical book on the broad subject of estate planning, including those aspects having to do with the preparation of documents, the inter-relationship of factors taking effect at death and those taking effect before death, and the necessities, both of commission and omission or avoidance, resulting from the application of the tax laws to the -subject.
The material was developed from preparations for lectures to practicing attorneys at the University of Colorado in 1956. Thus, the subject is approached from the standpoint of the practicing lawyer, his needs and problems. It has the virtue of being comprehensive and at the same time detailed and specific enough in the numerous areas and divisions of the field to provide a basic understanding of as well as to suggest answers to the practical problems encountered in the planning of a client's estate. It is not meant to replace the tax services and does not do so. They must be used to supply the ultimate answers to the unusual or the particularly complicated questions that may emerge in the process of advising the individual client regarding his estate and business problems. However, one, asset of, the book is that Professor Bowe's treatment of the subject matter clarifies the branches of the estate planning field, thereby assisting the non-expert in determining where it may be fruitful to check further, such as in the tax services, for additional information on a point of particular concern, for the case law, or for recent decisions or regulations.
Of keen interest to the reviewer was the author's method of organization of the text material and its presentation in the table of contents, which facilitates quick reference to the discussion of particular subjects. Volume I is divided into three parts, the headings of -which indicate at a glance the principal large categories of the estate planner's problems, namely those related to (1) transfers at death, (2) transfers during life and (3) business purchase agreements. Following the general table of contents is a "Detailed Table of Contents" in which the subjects and areas of discussion are reduced to the smaller categories. For example, in part II, relating to transfers during life, Professor Bowe begins (in chapter VIII) with a basic discussion of the federal gift tax, the following sub-headings appearing: "Deductions and Exclusions"; "Tax Saving Through Gifts" (here two of the sub-paragraphs are "Relationship Between Estate and Gift Tax Rates" and "Advantages of Lifetime Gifts"); "Gifts of Future Interests"; "Gifts to Minors"; "Marital Privileges" (here the sub-paragraphs are "Gift-splitting" and "Gift-tax Marital Deduction"); "Valuation"; and "Selection of Gift Property." (404) The basic purpose of the book is to assist the practicing attorney in dealing with the practical problems of outlining an estate plan, plus the drawing of the proper papers to accomplish his and the client's desires with the maximum of tax savings. This purpose is carried out by rather frequent cross-references in the text to other portions of the book dealing with related matters and by numerous suggested forms which appear throughout the text and in comprehensive form at the end of volume II.
In most instances, Professor Eowe has succeeded in talking through the book in a manner suggesting a question being answered or a personal explanation being given. This tends to promote clarification and simplification of meaning, a quality always desirable when dealing with such a complicated subject.
The various phases and factors of a particular subject are considered in general at the same point (with references to other parts where necessary) so that the requirements and avoidances are rather simultaneously called to the attention of the reader. It also provides a link of understanding between the effect of estate taxes, income taxes and business practices. One illustration of this may be found in volume I at page 540, where, in duscussing buy and sell agreements between stockholders of corporations, it is pointed out that the stock of the deceased stockholder will receive a stepped-up basis (asset value) on the death of the stockholder, resulting in no income tax on sale under the agreement, and thus property of a deceased stockholder is taxed only once under the estate tax, rather than subjected to both estate and income taxes. Although every detail cannot, of course, be supplied, the inter-relationship of the various taxes are discussed in connection with insurance policies, large and small estates, farm estates, the family corporation and other areas of interest to the planner. This type of comprehensive treatment, together with the extensive forms, makes it not only a tool of the law but a whole steamshovel in the area of estate planning. This book might have given a clear indication in part I as to the relationship between the will, and its provisions, and the discussion of the estate tax. While the idea undoubtedly is that one must know to what the estate tax applies before proper provisions of a will can be drafted, usefulness to those not experienced in the field might have been enhanced had this connection been emphasized.
Interesting additions to the book are an introductory section entitled "A Quick Survey of Basic Estate Tax Planning" giving various factors which must be considered in estate planning with references to the chapter or chapters of the book in which they are discussed, and a section containing a survey of forms which provides a quick reference to the complete form for a particular planning purpose.
This is a book that should be studied, and for the student or practitioner of practical estate planning, it is an extremely valuable and worthwhile work.
SmITH N. CROWE, JR.* *Attorney, Columbia, Missouri.
Broad-gauge legal scholarship is an exacting challenge. Too often the challenge is not met but avoided: The writer either ignores the difficulties of his subject, turning out a compendium of case squibs with connecting commentary, narrows the scope of his activity so as to turn out erudite infinitesimalities, or, terrified by the enormous labor of doing a big job well, decides not to write at all, turning out nothing but book reviews. It is important, therefore, when a scholar is willing to undertake the labor and the risks of error involved in a major work.
Albert Ehrenzweig, Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, has accepted the challenge of writing critically about a large field of law. His subject is conflict of laws. He brings to it a wide experience in public and private practice, both abroad and in this country, and of teaching and writing. In the main, he has met the challenge. In a few respects he has not. Ironically, the very excellence of his better discussion induces a discernment in the reader which then lays bare some of the author's weaker material. But whatever the precise balance between the stronger and the weaker portions of his treatment, we are obliged that the author has come into print.' His book is well worth reading and having, both for the lawyer and judge and for the student and teacher.
Professor Ehrenzweig--has -mader a number of departures from the more conventional treaties on conflicts. In the first place, he has sought to avoid undue generalization about the conflicts rules themselves. Professor Joseph Beale, and the Restatement ofwhich he was so much the, author, attempted such a generalization of conflicts that it became a full-fledged subject unto itself. The generalizations which Beale formulated are not only of illusory certainty but frequently are totally divorced from the substantive law problems about which the conflict of laws occurred. Following the philosophy of Walter Wheeler Cook, Professor Ehrenzweig has attempted to recognize that conflicts is not so much a "subject" with subdivisions relating to various bodies of substantive law as it is a series of subdivisions of particular bodies of substantive law. This diference of view has manifold practical consequences in how we look at conflicts problems.
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In the second place, Professor Ehrenzweig has differentiated between conflicts arising between the law of this country and foreign countries on de one hand, and, on the other hand, those arising between sister states in this country. 3 The impact of 1. Much of the material has appeared previously in the author's many law review articles. The book ties this material together, updates it and in a number of instances reshapes it.
2. For example, it cannot be said that a judgment is a judgment is a judgment. A "final" adjudication in domestic relations law is not the same thing as a "final" adjudication in a case involving title to real property.
3. Perhaps equally important, he has largely or entirely abandoned any reliance on intrastate venue cases as being illustrative of, let alone authority for, rules relating to conflict of laws. Beale in particular made wide use of cases involving venue and "jurisdiction" of local courts-particularly courts of limited jurisdiction. This is both annoying and inaccurate, and probably had adverse effects not only on the development of conflicts rules but also on the law of venue.
[Vol. 24 the full faith and credit clause on judgment recognition makes this differentiation useful, probably indispensable. Moreover, because of his European background, the author is able to give us a comparative treatment of the civil law and common law approaches both to conflicts law as such and to the substantive law's treatment of particular problems. In a shrinking world (St. Louis is now only 300 miles from an ocean port), these problems are becoming of increasing practical importance to the lawyer.
Finally, the author's approach is primarily an analysis and critique of the conflicts rules rather than a restatement of them. At times this takes the form of an explanation of what the courts are really doing, as distinct from what they say they are doing. At times it is-a call for rejection both of what is being said and what is being done. At times it is a voice crying in the wilderness of entrenched doctrine. But throughout it is a demand for reconsideration, re-evaluation and reformulation.
This demand must be met if the law is to keep abreast of the burdens which a mobile and urbanized society is placing on it. Conflicts concepts formulated 100 years ago, or even 50 years ago, are no longer adequate to the purposes they are supposed to serve today. In this book we are constantly met with this fact and called upon to do something about it.
So much, then, for the basic orientation of the book. What is its specific subject matter? The present volume is the first of two, later to be combined into one. It deals with what we ordinarily call jurisdiction and judgments-the power of a court to act and the consequences elsewhere of the fact that it has acted. (The second volume will cover choice of law.) Of especial interest are two large sections, one dealing with the litigating capacity of parties-such as nonresident guardians and unincorporated associations-and the other dealing with divorce and other domestic relations litigation. In addition, he deals with jurisdiction in personam and in rem, refusal to exercise jurisdiction, both for "want of jurisdiction" and on the ground of forum non conveniens, and the effect of judgments of various kinds rendered in various circumstances. Throughout the book we can feel the author's comparative law approach and the primacy he places on the substantive law. 
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draw on the post-Erie cases involving the relation between state and federal law for light on the relation between the law of state and state. 8 At times he is a little disappointing. Thus, his conviction that broad generalizations are dangerous and inaccurate leads him to minimize unduly the continuing impact of established generalizations. For example, the rules relating to personal jurisdiction probably ought to vary with the substantive law context, 0 but I think it an overstatement to say that such is the law today. 10 Moreover, in general I think he gives an inadequate picture of the divergencies of view found in the Supreme Court's decisions of the last two decades: While perhaps there are trends, the trends are more sinuous and halting, and the law more uncertain, than Professor Ehrenzweig implies."1 Again, the conflicts problems of class suits seem to me to be inadequately penetrated, mostly because the civil procedure men have given him so little to work with. Finally, in the area of domestic relations, where he has so much that is valuable, I think he has taken a wrong turn on the problems of child custody decrees. He would emphasize, to the practical exclusion of other factors, the power of each court to "assume or decline jurisdiction over a foreign child, without regard to legalistic formulas, whenever the walfare of the child sD requires." 12 I think this approach will postpone and perhaps complicate the problems without solving them.
All of these criticisms, however, should not detract from the value and importance. of Pxofessor Ebenzweis book-Wile-his ideas-are often novel, often difficult, and cast in a style and arrangement which sometimes makes it hard to follow him 8. Fortunately, he does not put too much stock in the Supreme Court's actual treatment of "substance" and "procedure" in the Erie field. As Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 78 S. Ct. 893 (1958) , demonstrates, the Court has a long way to travel, mostly by way of retreat, before it will have developed a workable solution to this problem. Elsewhere, he characterizes child custody proceedings as "extra-litigious," p. 202, in the sense that they are not merely adversary proceedings but involve active intervention by the state. But the intervention of the state in a particular custody battle is usually at the behest of one of the parents, and frequently a parent who, because he lives locally or for some other reason, believes he can get the court to "intervene" in his favor. The answer to the problem, it seems to me, will not be found in allowing every court with colorable claim to jurisdiction to "intervene" and redetermine the child's welfare, but in recognizing that a determination of the child's custody ought to have substantial invulnerability to attack elsewhere. To have the rendering court reconsider the needs of the child is something else again. See my thoughts on this in Hazard, easily, effort spent on these pages will be well repaid.
1 3 The author uses recent cases for all propositions except those requiring historical explanation, or for which the only available authority is old. He cites secondary materials liberally, thus providing a quick avenue into the detailed collections of cases and accompanying analysis which are to be found in the legal periodicals, while at the same time avoiding either prolix citation or barrenness of authority. Especially for the lawyer who has a case on the adverse side of a traditional doctrine, Professor Ehrenzweig has an armory of historical, logical and authoritative weapons for advocacy. How much effect his thinking will have on the judicial process remains to be seen. I suspect it will be a good deal. But this will largely depend on the willingness of courts to forego the "let George do it" reliance on legislative solution to legal problems and instead to push on with the unfolding process which is the common law's strength.
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD This book, the editor of which is a professor of English who also on previous occasions was interested in building a bridge between law and literature, is a valuable anthology of treasures of the art of literary style. The miscellaneous subjects covered therein by various authors, lawyers as well as non-lawyers, have this in common that all of them are to a certain extent related to law and those professionally concerned with it. And most of the separate pieces thus assembled are human interest features.
Lawyers as well as those who are not our brethren in the legal profession are thus offered an opportunity for inspiring and delightful reading. It does, of course, not detract from the value of the book that the reviewer does not completely agree with the selection that was instrumental in its composition, exclusion as well as inclusion.
This is certainly a matter on which there may be reasonable disagreement and on which the editor's taste and the space made available to him by the publishers must be the final criterion. While one or the other reader may not be fully satisfied in this respect, no reader will fail to welcome the enrichment which the editor has given to the anthology by placing before each of its component items a concise, but interesting, introductory note, except in those few instances where this is substituted by a crossreference to a preceding note.
The main title of the book, Voices in Court, is a misnomer if the reviewer is correct in believing that that phrase properly applies only to what is said in court, 13. The author's style is not only complex but very compact. Moreover, the text has innumerable cross-references, both explicit and implicit. Accordingly, following the author's analysis will be difficult for the student and for the lawyer who is rusty on his conflicts law. The best way to approach the book, therefore, is to look through it from cover to cover with some care before attempting to search out a particular point. For the latter purpose, the index seems quite good.
*Associate Professor of Law, University of California (Berkeley).
may perhaps also be applied to what is said by the court, but is not apt to refer to something which is neither said in court nor by the court. sidered as "obscene." The editor would have done well had he given at least one specimen of those decisions whereby American judges sometimes show that the seriousness of the law and the dignity of the judicial office do not preclude an ingenious display of a sense of humor by a witty judge. And most regrettable is that he did not include at least one of those masterpieces of literary style as well as legal acumen whereby Holmes became "The Great Dissenter," for instance his dissenting opinion in the naturalization case of Mrs. Schwimmer.3
Several actual and fictitious trials are reterred to in the book. Among the actual ones is the famous defamation action wherein Oscar Wilde appeared as plaintiff against the Marquis of Queensberry, as the tragic aftermath of which the great poet was criminally prosecuted for and convicted of homosexuality. The extract included is from H. Montgomery Hyde's The Trials of Oscar Wilde, and, in the editor's words, "is from the cross-examination on the afternoon of the second day when Wilde who up to that point had toyed with the great cross-examiner Sir Edward Carson, made his fatal slip." The masterful performance of two celebrities among one-time British trial lawyers, Sir Rufus Isaacs, then Attorney -General, and Sir Edward Marshall Hall, in the celebrated case against the poisoner Seddon, Isaacs acting as prosecutor, and Hall as defense counsel, is presented in he item entitled "The Seddon Case," taken from Edward Majoriban's For the Defense: The Life of Sir Edward Marshal. Another defamation case which resulted in a catastrophe for the plaintiff, though in a different way from the Oscar Wilde case, and in which another luminary of the one-time British Bar, Sir Charles Russell, conducted the cross-examination that became ruinous to the.plaintiff, is recalled-inThe-Barcarat Case, a loan piece from Edward Wilfrid Fordham's Notable Cross-Examinations. The case was at the time most sensational since it concerned a scandal in which the then Prince of Wales, later King Edward VII, was involved. Finally a murder case involving not an historical figure, but a "small fry" defendant, an American Negro, but most noteworthy by the highly idealistic and successful performance of his voluntarily uncompensated counsel, Mr. Clinton Gidding Brown of San Antonio, Texas, is in an extremely heartwarning manner described by the latter in "The Jim Wheat Murder Case," taken from his book You May Take the Witness.
Turning to the fictitious trial stories included in this anthology we must first -mention Stephen -Vincent Ben4t's The Devil and Daniel Webster, describing "with local color and Faustian overtones," to use the editor's words, the trial of Jabez Stone before Justice Hathorne, with the Devil and Daniel Webster as opposing counsel. The author has made numerous other notable contributions to the American literature, including John Brown's Body for which he received the Pulitzer Prize for Poetry in 1929. But, in the reviewer's eyes he has reached the peak of his creation in that wonderful account of the forensic battle between Webster and the Devil. Among similarly outstanding pieces of trial ficton which, however, are not included in the anthology is the reviewer's favorite, Anatole France's, the French Nobel Prize winner's, Crainquebille. Space therefore could have been gained by not including another masterpiece which is too well known to have needed inclusion, "Bardell v. Pickwick," from Charles Dickens' The Pickwick Papers. Most welcome is, however, the inclusion of the observations of an outstanding legal historian on Dickens' Bleak House, the item entitled "Bleak House and the Procedure of the Court of Chancery," taken from William S. Holdsworth's Charles Dickens as Legal Historian. One of the shortest, but also of the most delicious items of the collection, is "Madame Luneau's Case" by Guy De Maupassant. It tells about a kind of Salomonic judgment in a trial wherein the plaintiff sought to recover a stipulated compensation for the making of a child. The reviewer does not agree with the editor's comment that "it is written with a total cynicism that is astonishing even today," rather believes that the story is satirical, but not cynical. Turning to another item, that great novelist, Anthony Trollope, is represented by an extract from his Phineas Redux, entitled "Phineas Finn Awaits Trial or Chaffanbrass on the Law." The full story is that of a trial for murder in which the innocent defendant is acquitted; there is little of this in the particular extract which contains, however, interesting professional observations of the fictional Mr. Chaffanbrass, supposed to be old barrister with great experience as defense counsel. Not represented in the anthology are the American lynch trial fictions, of which the reviewer believes Erskine Caldwell's Trouble in July to be the best one. But included is that most ingenious piece of writing of a Harvard Law School professor, Lon L. Fuller's The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, which is a most felicitous merger of the fictional story of a murder trial, to take place in "4300," with a serious discussion of legal problems. Before concluding these references to the fictional part of the book, one of the items omitted therein will be singled out, the German Heinrich von Kleist's classic short Michael Kohlhaas. It most suspendingly deals with the psychological commutation of an honest man who out of a fanatic embitterment about a miscarriage of justice of which he became a victim continues his theretofore dignified life as a criminal, and thus ends on the gallows although by his inborn character he was not predestined therefor.
Apart from those parts, which are particularly attractive from a human interest standpoint, the anthology contains also numerous outstanding write-ups that are bound to be of greater interest to those professionally connected with the law than to lay readers. While regrettably nothing is taken from Rousseau or Montesquieu, there is included an essay "On the Law" by the French sixteenth century writer and philosopher Michel de Montaigne. From Henry David Thoreau's On the Duty of Civil Disobedience, "based on an incident involving his refusal to pay polltax to a government which allowed slavery," as the editor relates, we get his essay entitled "Unjust Law." -It is well knov that Gandhi, in his tactics of passive resistance which finally resulted in the sovereign independence of India, was inspired by Thoreau's book. That great judge, Learned Hand, is represented by his essay on "The Future of Wisdom in America." The late Arthur T. Vanderbilt, equally eminent as judge and as scholar, tells us about "The Growth of Substantive Law," in an extract from his Men and Measures in the Law. A distinguished federal judge, John C. Knox, looks back to the prohibition era in "Trouble with the Volstead Act," a portion of his A Judge Comes of Age. A fiction entitled "Old Judge and Young Lawyer," the ending of James Gould Cozzen's The Just and the Unjust is also included. This novel is, according to the editor of the anthology, strongly recommended by the Harvard reading list for law students. The reviewer believes, however, that another best seller of the same author, Cozzen's By Love Possessed, although most interesting from a legal point of view, 4 might be dangerous reading"
for such beginners in the legal profession who have not yet a firm understanding of its ethical principles. Close to the reality of professional ethics is Charles P. Curtis' ingenious essay "The Advocate," reprinted from that author's Its Your Law. The analysis, therein, of the ethical position of the defense counsel of a guilty client is one of the best discussions the reviewer has read of that perennial problem which seems to create more difficulty for laymen than for lawyers and has been frequently treated in fictional works, lor instance in Galsworthy's notable play Loyalties. The reviewer wholeheartedly subscribes to the following statement of Mr. Curtis: "In a way the practice of law is like free speech. It defends what we hate as well as what we most love." Turning from the advocate to the judge, we find the statement that "a great judge must be also a great man" in an essay on "The Judicial Temperament" which is taken from Homilies and Recreations by John Buchan, one-time Governor-General of Canada. He also says that "in the perfect judicial style there must be both wit and humour on occasion. ... " Included in the present book are two famous talks of Oliver Wendell Holmes, "The Profession of the Law" and "The Path of the Law." And in the item entitled "The Criminal Law" we find a criticism of our penal system by that sharp-tongued, but ingenious critic, H. L. Mencken, reprinted from A Mencken Chrestamathy. Francis ,. Wellman's outstanding writings on the art of handling testimonial evidence are represented by three items, one entitled "Art in Direct Examination," which is reprinted from his Day in Court, another entitled "The Manner of Cross-Examination," from his The Art of Cross-Examination, and the third one, entitled "The Cross-Examination of Mrs. Reginal Vanderbilt," from the same book. A British prosecutor's billiant cross-examination, conducted by the now Right Honorable Justice Birkett, is discussed in "The Reputation of the Dead," an extract from Joseph Dean's Hatred, Ridicule, or Contempt. We must finally mention three items that brilliantly deal with the relation between law and language and law and literature, namely: Lord Macmillian's "Law and Language," reprinted from his Law and Other Things, an extract from Benjamin N. Cardozo's Law and Literature, this extract bearing the same title, and an address on Language, Legal and Literary by John Mason Brown, delivered, in the editor's words, by "an American, not a lawyer by profession, but a distinguished literary figure."
The following passage from that speech may well serve as the conclusion of this review: "It is plain libel to assume, as some people do, that lawyers and jurists always employ English as if they were drawing up wills. Lawyers and jurists as writers do face certain dangers unknown to professional authors. They are excused from the necessity of entertaining and interesting their readers, and all too oftenlet's face the evidence-they take a cruel advantage of this enviable exception. Nonetheless, some of the best writing that we have has come from the pens of lawyers and but whose fame as a scholar is still alive, although he wrote at a time when people believed in witchcraft 2 and in our present days the predominant fear is that of an atomic war. He owes the immortality of his name to the revolutionary way in which he taught English law at Oxford, -prior to and after becoming the first 2. Blackstone himself wrote in the Commentaries: "To deny the possibility, and, actual existence of witchcraft and sorcery, is at once flatly to contradict the revealed word of God, in various passages both of the Old and New Testament: and the thing itself is a truth in which every nation in the world hath in its turn borne testimony, either by examples seemingly well attested or by prohibitory laws, which at least suppose the possibility of commerce with evil spirits." EHaLIcH's BLACKSTONE 772 (1959).
3. That chair was established after the death of Charles Viner who in his will had bequeathed for this purpose the copyright of his Abridgment of Law and Equity and other property totalling in value 12,000 English pounds. LOCKmLER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 44.
4. The Vinerian professorship at Oxford served in this country as the inspiration for the creation, in 1779, of a similar chair at the William and Mary College in Williamsburg, Virginia, an act of Thomas Jefferson, then governor of Virginia. The first common law professor at that college was George Wythe, one of the pupils of whom was the later Chief Justice John Marshall. LOCKMILLER, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 46.
5. "Blackstone's influence has been far greater in the United States than in England." LOCKMimLER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 181.
has become a classic and -which, incidentally was also a great financial success," appeared in 1765; the fourth and final one in 1769. There have since been numerous republications of various kinds, including quite a few good American ones. The prevailing trend of the modern editions has been to bring good old Blackstone up to date by more or less elaborate footnotes indicating what has ceased to be living law, rather has become dead law, and what new legal developments, unforeseeable by the author of the Commentaries, have meanwhile taken place.
The present book takes a different approach as announced by Mr. Ehrlich in the following words of his short preface:
.. . each edition of Blackstone has been overwhelmed with a larger avalanche of footnotes and commentaries on the commentaries. I have taken Blackstone's original editions, excised the unnecessary and confusing, passages and digressions which are not of interest to the law today, translated any necessary Latin, and deleted all footnotes.
The result is a handy and neat volume, containing a strongly abridged and slightly revised version of that text of which Mr. Ehrlich in the same preface says:
By virtue both of his knowledge of law and of his literary genius Blackstone produced the one treatise on the common law which for all time must remain a part of English literature.
Much of Blackstone's presentation and discussion of law that has become obsolete, as for instance the details of the then feudal system, has been retained also in this edition, and rightly so. The Commentaries are nowadays mostly of interest for the student-of-legal history. And even where Blackstone writes about law that has long ago ceased to be in effect, his clear expression of his ideas, his elegant thought, in accordance with the fashion of the epoch, sometimes stilted style, 7 his ingenious attempt to rationalize the common law as a body of logically consistent and ethically and socially sound principles, s will continue to be delightful reading to lawyers as well as educated laymen.
While Mr. Ehrlich is technically wrong when in the preface he states that Blackstone's Commentaries, more than any other single book, are "the codification" of English and American law, his enthusiasm thus expressed is well understandable. And although there will be those who will not like the absence of footnotes establishing a bridge between Blackstone's and our modern law, there will be others who will agree with Mr. Ehrlich's belief that the footnotes are a nuisance and who will therefore welcome their having been thrown overboard in this new edition.
MAXnULIAN KOESSra* 6. "It is said that Blackstone realized no less than £16,000 by his Commentaries -a remuneration which, I believe, no writer ever received for a single law-book before or after." Odgers, supra note 1, at 612. What is the ideological essence of that conception, referred to as law, which is inherent in and gives a glamour of moral authority to those rules and institutions that, varying according to time and place, constitute the so-called positive law?
Is this ubiquitous social phenomenon a creation of that species of animal which conceitedly calls itself "homo sapiens," or is it inherent in its very nature? What is the difference between law and justice, and what is the difference between law and ethical precepts? What is the relation between law and logic, between law and history, and between law and power? Is the process of adjudication a process of creation or one of merely application of law, or is it both? What is the relation between customary law and a mere custom? Is what has been called "living law" law or a sociological fact? Does law cease to be law when it has become obsolete because the conditions in the light of which it was created do not exist any more? Is international law properly denominated law, or is it something different from law? Those and other questions of a similarly general nature have inspired penetrating thoughts of eminent authors throughout the ages of recorded history. The following defeatist statement is contained in a popularly, but ingeniously written book: "We dream of 'a government of laws, not men.' But at the very outset of any approach to the law we discover a rather astounding and embarrassing fact: mentioned in Professor Morris' anthology, although it can hardly be denied that Kelsen is a giant in the field of jurisprudence and far more outstanding in that respect than some of those included in the anthology. We are thereupon made to meet another famous Englishman, John Stuart Mill (1806 -1873 , whose style is most delightful, as appears from the two included excerpts, one taken from the essay "On Liberty," the other from "Utilitarianism," only the latter having some relation to the field of legal philosophy, but the other one included because of the great political influence which that essay "On Liberty" had. "Its style and respect for intellectual freedom make it required reading," the editor observes in explanation of the inclusion. 10 The book then turns to one of the most ingenious and influential jurisprudential writers, Rudolph von Ihering (1818-1892), a German who during part of his life was teaching law at the University of Vienna and received his nobility title from the then Emperor of Austria. He was famous for his charming personality which is reflected in his most pleasant way of writing on matters that sometimes are covered in a dull manner. Included is a selection from his -most important jurisprudential book, Law as a Means to an End. The book thereupon presents that brilliant star in the firmament of American jurisprudence, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes , reproducing a talk he gave to Boston University Law School students, "The Path of the Law," and a note he wrote for the Harvard Law Review, "Natural Law." There follows an Austrian scholar, who was greatly admired by Holmes as well as Cardozo, Eugen Ehrlich (1862 -1922 In conclusion it is submitted that Professor Morris has not only assembled very interesting specimens of the pick of the crop of jurisprudential thought, but has added to this selection of masterpieces the following attractive feature. He introduces each reprint part with a short human interest essay, written by himself and very well written, dealing with life, career, and scholarly curriculum of the respective author. This newcomer in the field of jurisprudential literature is therefore well apt to serve not only study and reference, but also recreational reading purposes. 
